Monday, 21 April 2014

F.J. and E.B. v Austria - a problematic decision

The European Court of Human Rights has deemed the complaints in F.J. and E.B. v Austria inadmissible. 

The decision is extremely problematic because it conflates the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation arising from an unequal 'age of consent' with the treatment of persons suspected of having committed child sex offences.


The facts


The applicants, F.J. and E.B, were both independently investigated by the police 'on suspicion of [...] having committed homosexual acts with consenting male persons within the age bracket of fourteen to eighteen, an offence under the former Article 209' of the Austrian Criminal Code.


Article 209, prior to its repeal in 2002, applied a higher minimum age to sexual acts between men than that set for opposite-sex or female same-sex acts, criminalising male homosexual acts between adults and consenting males aged between 14 and 18. 
The Court held in 2003, in L. and V. v Austria, that Article 209 'embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority' and that this was not a 'sufficient justification for the differential treatment [of a homosexual minority] any more than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour'.  
E.B. (who is now deceased), along with several other applicants, was previously successful in the Court, in E.B. and Others v Austria, in respect of a complaint about the refusal of domestic authorities to delete convictions from their criminal records following convictions under Article 209 of the Austrian Criminal Code. 

However, E.B. (unlike F.J.) had also been investigated by the police in respect of having committed offences under Articles 207 (sexual activity with a child under the age of 14) and 207a (pornographic image of a child) of the Criminal Code. 

The complaints


Both F.J. and E.B. complained, under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, about data being stored by the police following investigations under Article 209.

They argued that 'there were still detrimental effects resulting from the past investigations conducted in respect of them on suspicion of their having committed offences under Article 209 of the Criminal Code, even though that provision had been repealed' and 'the Government were therefore under an obligation to provide sound reasons to justify the necessity of prolonging the negative consequences attaching to criminal investigations under Article 209 of the Criminal Code'.


E.B. also complained under Articles 14 and 8, about data held by the police in respect of investigations under Articles 207 (sexual activity with a child under the age of 14) and 207a (pornographic image of a child) of the Criminal Code. 

Therefore, whereas F.J. complained about the retention of data concerning acts between consenting persons that are no longer criminal offences, E.B. complained about the retention of data relating to acts that continue to be child sex offences. 

The Court has conflated discrimination in the 'age of consent' with child sex abuse  


The Court stated that the 'two applications concern similar facts and raise essentially identical issues under the Convention'.


This conclusion is extremely problematic given that E.B. (unlike F.J.) had been investigated for offences of sexual activity with a child under the age of 14 and the possession of pornographic images of a child. 


Combining these complaints conflates two very separate issues arising from very different sets of facts.


It conflates the case of F.J., who was investigated by the police for now repealed offences which, solely on the basis that they concerned men, were then subject to a higher minimum age, with E.B., who was investigated by the police for offences involving children that are applicable to all adult persons.


The facts in the case of F.J. give rise to a claim of discrimination because they concerned offences that related only to homosexual men; the facts in the case of E.B., insofar as they relate to child sexual abuse, do not give rise to any claim of discrimination. 


By combining the complaints the Court rejected the argument that Article 14 (discrimination) was applicable in both cases: 

"While Article 209 of the Criminal Code had been quashed by the Austrian Constitutional Court and therefore is no longer in force, the present cases not only concern police investigations under this provision against the first and second applicant but also investigations against the second applicant E.B. in respect of other offences, Articles 207 and 207a of the Criminal Code which still are in force. Thus, the essence of the applicants’ complaint is not an issue of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in breach of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 but whether the continued storing of certain data relating to these investigations constituted a justified interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The Court therefore considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 alone."


By deliberately considering the applications together, the Court effectively 'contaminated' F.J.'s case with the allegations of child sex offences relevant only to E.B.'s case. 


As a result, the Court ruled out the applicability of Article 14 to F.J.

The Court's decision: why the storage of police records did not breach the Convention

In assessing the necessity of interfering with the applicants' right to respect to their private life in a democratic society, the Court noted that all electronically processed data concerning the police investigations in respect of the applicants were deleted, although paper 'copy files' were retained.


It further noted that, following the repeal of Article 209 of the Criminal Code, the Austrian authorities substantially restricted access to the documents in the copy files and, at the applicants’ request, deleted cross-references to these files in the files record and the index cards. As a result of which the copy file was not traceable using these research tools. 


Furthermore, the storage of this information was for a limited period only, with copy files being stored for five years following the end of the year of recording, and index cards and filing registers for twenty years.


The Court concluded that 'in these particular circumstances the storage of data on the police investigations in respect of the applicants on suspicion of their having committed criminal offences struck a fair balance between the competing private and public interests that were at stake. There is accordingly no appearance of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention'.


Why this is a problematic decision


My view of the Court's decision is that it is problematic not because of the conclusion reached, but because of the route taken to reach it. 


Combining a complaint relating to child sex offences with a complaint relating to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is extremely problematic.


How can the Court think it appropriate to reach the conclusion that 'the storage of data on the police investigations in respect of the applicants on suspicion of their having committed criminal offences struck a fair balance between the competing private and public interests that were at stake' when the offences in question were obviously so different?


In the case of F.J., the suspicion related to repealed male homosexual offences. This means that, even if F.J. engaged in the same behaviour again, he would no longer be subject to any criminal sanction. 


In the case of E.B., the suspicion related to offences involving children which, if engaged in again, would (rightly) be subject to criminal sanction.


In my view, the Court should have considered these complaints separately 

Had it done so, it would have considered whether the 'suspicion' of each applicant gave rise to record keeping by the police that was necessary in a democratic society. 

If the Court had considered these complaints separately it may have reached the conclusion that in respect of E.B. the retention of records was necessary in a democratic society because it was a proportionate response to concerns over child sexual abuse, but that in respect of F.J. the retention of records was not necessary because it concerned offences which were no longer criminal. 

What I find most problematic in this decision is not the ultimate conclusion - that the complaints are inadmissible - but the fact that the Court considers that a complaint relating to police investigations of child sex offences is 'similar' to a complaint relating to police investigations of now repealed male homosexual offences. 


The Court has effectively equated consensual male homosexual sex (once, but no longer, criminalised) with child sexual abuse (which, rightly, continues to be criminalised).

I wonder, do the Judges sitting in the First Section of the Court have any understanding of how damaging such a view is, not least in their own institution where it formed the basis for decades of Convention jurisprudence upholding unequal ages of consent as necessary because of the alleged 'danger' of homosexual men to children?







Thursday, 17 April 2014

Freedom to express criticism of homophobia - Mladina d.d. Ljubljana v Slovenia

The European Court of Human Rights has today issued an interesting and important judgment, in Mladina d.d. Ljubljana v Slovenia, which upholds the right, under Article 10 of the Convention, to express criticism of homophobia. 

The Court was considering a complaint brought by the private company, Mladina d.d. Ljubljana, who is the publisher of the weekly magazine 'Mladina'.

The facts

In June 2005, Mladina published an article about the behaviour of certain deputies of the Slovenian National Party during a parliamentary debate on legislation to permit the registration of same-sex partnerships. 

In the article, Mladina paid attention to one deputy, B.Z, who it stated 'spouted forth all the same stupidities as at the previous reading [of the legislation] [...] and touched on the objections against his use of words such as "faggots" and "lesbians"'. 

Mladina also described the behaviour of S.P. who made statements such as 'none of us would want to have a son or a daughter who would opt for this kind of marriage’ and made 'a coffeehouse imitation which was probably supposed to clearly illustrate some orthodox understanding of a stereotypically effeminate and mannered faggot'. Mladina stated this behaviour was 'the typical attitude of a cerebral bankrupt who is lucky to be living in a country with such a limited pool of human resources that a person of his characteristics can even end up in Parliament, when in a normal country worthy of any respect he could not even be a janitor in the average urban primary school'.

The Slovenian domestic courts

In response to the article, S.P. successfully took legal action against the publisher of Mladina in the domestic courts. 

S.P. argued that inter alia he had 'suffered severe mental distress due to the offensiveness of the article'.

The Ljubljana District Court, in partially upholding S.P.’s claim, stated that:

  • the use of the term 'cerebral bankrupt' had referred to S.P.'s 'personal characteristics and was therefore objectively offensive' and, as such, 'did not simply serve the purpose of imparting information to the public'; 
  • the gestures he had used to mimic the behaviour of a homosexual man were 'simply reminiscent of gestures made by actors to convey the idea of homosexuality', that this was not 'offensive to homosexuals', and was not 'aimed at promoting prejudice and intolerance against them'. 

The District Court ordered the publisher to pay damages.

Further domestic proceedings ensued, culminating in an unsuccessful complaint by the publisher to the Constitutional Court.

The European Court of Human Rights

The publisher complained that the decisions of the domestic courts had violated its right to the freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the Convention.

The Court decided that the decisions of the domestic courts amounted to an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression (this was not disputed by the applicant and the Government) and that the interference was prescribed by law.

In considering whether the interference was 'necessary in a democratic society', the Court applied its long-standing framework for determining whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference were 'relevant and sufficient' and whether the measure taken was 'proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued'.

The key issue for the Court was whether the reasons adduced by the domestic authorities were 'sufficient' for the purposes of satisfying the 'necessary in a democratic society' test. 

The Court held that the reasons given by the domestic courts could not be regarded as a sufficient justification for the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression for the following reasons:

  • describing S.P.’s conduct as that of a 'cerebral bankrupt' was extreme and could legitimately be considered offensive but the remark was a value judgment and had the character of a metaphor which, in the context of an intense debate in which opinions were expressed with little restraint, was an expression of strong disagreement, even contempt for S.P.’s position, rather than a factual assessment of his intellectual abilities; 
  • S.P., following the line of other members of his party, portrayed homosexuals as a generally undesirable sector of the population and, in order to reinforce his point, he imitated a homosexual man through the use of specific gestures which may be regarded as ridicule promoting negative stereotypes to which the publisher's remarks provided a counterpoint; 
  • the impugned statement, and the style used in the article, did not amount to a gratuitous personal attack on S.P. and, moreover, political invective often spills over into the personal sphere. 

The Court concluded that the domestic courts had not convincingly established that there was any pressing social need for placing the protection of S.P.’s reputation above the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting freedom of expression where issues of public interest are concerned. 

Since the interference complained of was not 'necessary in a democratic society', the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

Importance of the judgment

The Court's judgment is important because it establishes an effective right to robustly contest homophobic speech and gestures through public expression. 

Given that the type of homophobia addressed in the judgment is endemic in the political discourse of many Council of Europe states, it is vital that individuals and private companies are protected under Article 10 when they seek to publicly contest it. 

The judgment evolves Article 10 rights in respect of sexual orientation in a significant way by making clear that strongly formulated counter-remarks made to homophobic persons fall inside the protection offered by Article 10.

Whilst the Court's Article 10 jurisprudence relating to sexual orientation is very under-developed, this judgment can be read in relation to Vejdeland v Sweden, in which the Court placed homophobic hate speech outside the protection of Article 10. 

It remains for the Court to uphold an Article 10 complaint brought by a homosexual applicant in respect of interference with freedom of expression on the grounds of sexual orientation, but today's judgment is certainly a step in the right direction for protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms relating to sexual orientation.

Tuesday, 15 April 2014

Book launch and talk: Law, Religion and Homosexuality

I'm delighted that Terry Sanderson, President of the National Secular Society and long-time advocate of lesbian and gay legal equality, will join me and Robert Vanderbeck to launch our new book Law, Religion and Homosexuality.

The event is on Wednesday June 18th, at the Conway Hall in London, and everyone is welcome. 

Free wine and lots of discussion/debate:

Tuesday, 25 March 2014

New article on 'homosexual propaganda' laws in the Russian Federation

Maria Issaeva and Maria Kiskachi, both of Threefold Legal Advisors LLC (based in Moscow), have published the piece 'Immoral Truth vs. Untruthful Morals? Attempts to Render Rights and Freedoms Conditional Upon Sexual Orientation in Light of Russia's International Obligations'.

The authors state:

...this article must inevitably conclude that a strong case can be made that Russia’s prohibition on the ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships’ is incompatible with international law and that amendments concerning adoptive parents are potentially discriminatory in character....

...the legislative approach currently under adoption in Russia is [...] clearly aimed at the degradation of existing international standards in this respect – pluralism, broadmindedness and tolerance being among them.

The article can be downloaded here:

http://russianlawjournal.org/data/documents/Issaeva-LRG_1_2014.pdf


 

Friday, 14 March 2014

'Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights' published in paperback

I'm pleased to say that my book, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights, has now been issued by Routledge in a revised and updated paperback edition.

The paperback differs from the previous hardback in two key ways:

First, it includes a new preface which gives an overview of the Court's jurisprudence relating to sexual orientation between early 2012 (when the book originally went to press) and January 2014.

Second, the chronological table of cases at the end of the book has been updated to January 2014 and, furthermore, I have revised its approach.

Details available here:

http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415632638/

Thursday, 13 March 2014

New 'sexual orientation' fact sheet published by the Court

The European Court of Human Rights has updated its sexual orientation fact sheet

Notable pending cases listed in the fact sheet are:

Article 3 focused complaints 

Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridize v Georgia (ill treatment by police)

Identoba and Others v Georgia (failure of authorities to protect individuals from ill-treatment)

M.E. v Sweden (deportation of married homosexual man to Libya)

Article 12 focused complaints 

Oliari and Others v Italy (same-sex couples unable to marry or access any other partnership recognition)

Orlandi and Others v Italy (same-sex couples unable to marry)

Article 14 focused complaints 

Bonnaud and Lecoq v France (refusal to grant parental authority to same-sex partner)

Hallier and Lucas v France (refusal to give same-sex partner of parent paternity leave)

Taddeucci and McCall v Italy (refusal of family permit to same-sex partner resulting in lack of right to residence)

Article 10 focused complaint

Bayev and Others v Russia (impact of 'homosexual propaganda' laws)


Article 11 focused complaint

Zhdanov and Rainbow House v Russia (refusal to register an organisation)


Monday, 24 February 2014

Sexual Orientation and the European Convention on Human Rights: Voices and Perspectives - full programme

The full programme for the "Sexual Orientation and the European Convention on Human Rights: Voices and Perspectives" event at the University of York, on Friday 16th May, is now available here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByFm9fY-KH05dUlEb194MkpPWFk/edit?usp=sharing

There are a small number of places remaining for this event so, if you would like to attend, please email me.